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BRIEF OF CORPORATE LAW PROFESSORS 
AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT 
OF NEITHER PARTY 
The undersigned corporate law professors respect-
fully submit this brief as amici curiae in support of 
neither party.1 
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 
Amici have no personal stake in the outcome of 
this case; their interest is in assisting the parties and 
the Court in understanding corporate law and the 
rights of shareholders, insofar as that law and those 
rights are relevant to the questions presented in this 
case.  Joining in this brief as amici are the following 
twenty-two law professors, whose research and teach-
ing have focused on corporate law: 
John C. Coates IV, John F. Cogan, Jr. Professor of 
Law and Economics, Harvard Law School, and Visit-
ing Professor of Finance, Harvard Business School 
Michal Barzuza, Nicholas E. Chimicles Research 
Professor of Business Law and Regulation, University 
of Virginia Law School 
Lucian A. Bebchuk, William J. Friedman and Ali-
cia Townsend Friedman Professor of Law, Economics, 
                                            
1 Pursuant to Rule 37.6, amici state that no counsel for a 
party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no counsel or 
party made a monetary contribution intended to fund the prep-
aration or submission of this brief.  No person other than amici 
curiae or their counsel made a monetary contribution to the 
preparation or submission of the brief.  Pursuant to Rule 37.3(a), 
all appropriate parties have filed letters granting blanket con-
sent to the filing of amici curiae briefs. 
  
2 
and Finance, and Director of the Program on Corpo-
rate Governance, Harvard Law School  
Bernard S. Black, Nicholas D. Chabraja Professor, 
Northwestern University Law School and Kellogg 
School of Management  
John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law 
and Director of the Center on Corporate Governance, 
Columbia Law School 
James D. Cox, Brainerd Currie Professor of Law, 
Duke University School of Law 
Mira Ganor, Judge Solomon Casseb, Jr. Research 
Professor in Law, University of Texas School of Law 
Ronald J. Gilson, Marc and Eva Stern Professor of 
Law and Business, Columbia Law School, and 
Charles J. Meyers Professor of Law and Business, 
Emeritus, Stanford Law School 
Jeffrey N. Gordon, Richard Paul Richman Profes-
sor of Law and Co-Director, Richman Center for Busi-
ness, Law & Public Policy, Columbia Law School 
Lawrence Hamermesh, Emeritus Professor, Wid-
ener University Delaware Law School, and Executive 
Director, University of Pennsylvania Institute for 
Law and Economics 
Henry B. Hansmann, Oscar M. Ruebhausen Pro-
fessor of Law, Yale Law School 
Marcel Kahan, George T. Lowy Professor of Law, 
New York University School of Law 
Vikramaditya S. Khanna, William W. Cook Profes-
sor of Law, University of Michigan Law School  
Michael Klausner, Nancy and Charles Munger 
  
3 
Professor of Business and Professor of Law, Stanford 
Law School 
Reinier H. Kraakman, Ezra Ripley Thayer Profes-
sor of Law, Harvard Law School 
Donald C. Langevoort, Thomas Aquinas Reynolds 
Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center 
Brian JM Quinn, Associate Dean for Experiential 
Learning and Associate Professor of Law, Boston Col-
lege Law School  
Edward B. Rock, Professor of Law and Director, In-
stitute for Corporate Governance & Finance, New 
York University School of Law  
Mark J. Roe, David Berg Professor of Law, 
Harvard Law School 
Helen S. Scott, Professor of Law and Co-Director of 
the Leadership Program on Law and Business, New 
York University School of Law 
Holger Spamann, Professor of Law, Harvard Law 
School 
Randall S. Thomas, John S. Beasley II Professor of 
Law and Business, Vanderbilt Law School 
  
  
4 
 INTRODUCTION AND 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Most individual shareholders cannot obtain full 
information about a corporation’s speech or political 
activities, even after the fact, nor can most sharehold-
ers prevent their savings from being used for political 
activity with which they disagree.  These often-mis-
understood points of corporate law are relevant to this 
case in two ways.  
First, this Court has often looked to the rights of 
corporate shareholders in determining the rights of 
union members and non-members to control the un-
ion’s use of their funds for political spending, and vice 
versa.2  In doing so, the Court has sometimes assumed 
that if shareholders disapprove of corporate political 
expression, they can easily sell their shares or exer-
cise control over corporate spending.3  As explained in 
this brief, that assumption is mistaken.    
                                            
2 E.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 
343-44 (2010); McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 
325 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring & dissenting), overruled in 
part by 558 U.S. 310; Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Com-
merce, 494 U.S. 652, 709-10 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting), 
overruled by 558 U.S. 310; Fed. Election Comm’n v. Mass. Citi-
zens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 247 (1986); First Nat’l Bank v. 
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 n.34 (1978); Pipefitters Local Union 
No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 401-02, 406-08 (1972); 
United States v. Int’l Union UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 585 (1957). 
3 E.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 370; McConnell, 540 U.S. 
at 275 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring); Austin, 494 U.S. at 709-
10 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. 
Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 555 (1980) (Blackmun, 
J., dissenting); Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 794 n.34; see also Int’l Assoc. 
of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 678 
F.2d 1092, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
  
5 
Union non-members are currently protected from 
being forced to fund union political expression or ac-
tivity by opt-out rights under Abood v. Detroit Bd. of 
Ed., 431 U.S. 209 (1977), and plaintiff in this case 
seeks the more expansive right to refuse to fund any 
union activity whatsoever.  In contrast, individual 
shareholders currently have no “opt out” rights or 
practical ability to avoid subsidizing corporate politi-
cal expression with which they disagree.  Nor do indi-
viduals have the practical option to refrain from put-
ting any of their savings into equity investments, as 
doing so would impose damaging economic penalties 
and ignore conventional financial guidance for indi-
vidual investors.  If the Court decides to give union 
non-members additional rights to refuse to contribute 
to union speech, the Court should not act on the erro-
neous belief that this will accord union non-members 
the same rights enjoyed by individual investors.   
Second, most Americans must routinely fund 
speech with which they disagree.  While some of this 
compulsion is from practical reality rather than law—
individuals could in theory refuse to invest in any 
stocks or equity if they are willing to bear the poten-
tially massive economic penalties that come from 
leaving their savings in cash and bonds—there are 
numerous examples outside the union context of laws 
that require individuals to fund expressive activities.  
This Court has dealt with public universities that re-
quire students to pay activities fees that fund groups 
those students may disagree with, Bd. of Regents of 
Univ. of Wisconsin Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 
221 (2000), and state bars that use funds for regulat-
ing the legal profession, Keller v. State Bar of Califor-
nia, 496 U.S. 1, 13 (1990).  Other examples abound, 
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but most relevant here are the laws enacted by a num-
ber of states requiring public employees to contribute 
to defined contribution plans to fund their retire-
ment.4  Michigan, for instance, requires many public 
employees to contribute at least 2% of their pay to a 
retirement plan, while Oklahoma requires at least 
4.5%.5  Not only do many of these plans require par-
ticipants to pay fees to third-party administrators—
entities that may use these funds for lobbying or other 
political activity—but as explained in this brief in-
vestment in virtually any retirement plan option re-
quires subsidizing blatant political speech that the in-
dividual can neither affect nor prevent.  There is, 
simply put, very little way for most individuals in 
modern America to avoid subsidizing speech with 
which they disagree.   
Part I of this brief shows that corporate law does 
not afford shareholders any right to “opt out” or oth-
erwise control the use of capital they have invested in 
a corporation.  Part II explains that most corporate 
shareholders have no ability to use voting rights or 
sell their shares to prevent their invested capital from 
being used in ways with which they disagree.  Part III 
                                            
4 Alicia H. Munnell et al., Defined Contribution Plans in the 
Public Sector: An Update, 37 STATE AND LOCAL PENSION PLANS, 
April 2014, at 1, 2-4, available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/
uploads/2014/04/SLP_37_508rev.pdf.  
5 Id. at 3; Oklahoma Public Employees Retirement System, 
The New Defined Contribution System: Understanding the Ba-
sics, http://www.opers.ok.gov/dc-basics (last visited Dec. 1, 
2017).  Ohio requires state teachers to contribute 14% of their 
pay to a defined contribution plan.  STRS Ohio, DC Plan, https://
www.strsoh.org/aboutus/impact/dc.html (last visited Dec. 1, 
2017). 
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describes how investment structures, tax policy, and 
conventional financial advice all drive individuals to 
invest in ways that reinforce their inability to obtain 
information about or control corporate political 
spending. 
ARGUMENT  
I. Individual Shareholders Generally Have 
No Right to “Opt Out” or Otherwise 
Control the Use of Capital They Invest in 
a Corporation. 
What can a shareholder do if she disagrees with a 
corporate expenditure, whether on a particular busi-
ness strategy or in support of a political position?  The 
short answer is very little.  Shareholders do not typi-
cally have any right to control or direct the use of cap-
ital they have invested in a corporation, whether pub-
licly or privately owned.   
Authority over corporate funds resides in a board 
of directors and officers to whom the board delegates 
authority.6  Shareholders of U.S. corporations have no 
authority to instruct or control boards, officers, em-
ployees, or corporate agents in how they act for a cor-
                                            
6  ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 105 (Little, 
Brown & Co., 1986) (“directors . . . have the formal legal power 
to manage the corporation”); Del. Code Ann. Title 8, § 141(a) 
(West 2017).  Delaware has been the leading corporate jurisdic-
tion for decades, and this section is based primarily on Delaware 
law, but fairly summarizes the law in other states as well.   
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poration, or to directly manage or act for a corpora-
tion.7  Instead, a “stockholder owns an interest in a 
share of stock, a financial investment granting no di-
rect control over the properties, equipment, contract 
rights, organizational structure, and other elements 
that make up the corporation itself.”8   
Indeed, a core goal of corporate law is to give di-
rectors and officers legal authority to act in ways with 
which shareholders may profoundly disagree.  Direc-
tors, officers, employees, and corporate agents are not 
agents of shareholders, and owe shareholders no duty 
of obedience.9  This “separation of ownership and con-
trol” is often identified as a fundamental or essential 
attribute of the corporate form.10  “A review of ele-
mentary corporate law shows that [the] power of [a] 
                                            
7 CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 
232 (Del. 2008) (“it is well-established that stockholders of a cor-
poration . . . may not directly manage the business and affairs of 
the corporation”).  In Europe, shareholders do have rights to in-
struct directors.  REINIER KRAAKMAN, ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF 
CORPORATE LAW 73 (Oxford 2d ed. 2009).  
8 Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of 
Corporate Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 
58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 193 (1991).  For recent cases illustrating 
this point, see, e.g., Gorman v. Salamone, 2015 WL 4719681, *5 
(Del. Ch. July 31, 2015); CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 237. 
9 Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in 
PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 55, 55-57 
(John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., Harvard Business 
School Press 1985). 
10  E.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 8-9 (Foundation Press, 2002); WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET 
AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGAN-
IZATION 79 (Aspen Publishers, 4th ed. 2012). 
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principal to direct the activities of [an] agent does not 
apply to the stockholders against the directors or of-
ficers of their corporation.”11  
Directors and officers are fiduciaries for the corpo-
ration as a whole, and face judicial scrutiny in share-
holder-initiated lawsuits over whether they have 
acted with care or engaged in self-dealing.12  How-
ever, their duties do not compel directors to use cor-
porate funds to speak, or avoid speaking, in political 
controversies as they believe shareholders would pre-
fer, because the most basic of corporate law doc-
trines—the “business judgment rule”—precludes ju-
dicial review of board decisions, absent evidence of a 
conflict of interest or a complete failure to exercise 
any care.13   
                                            
11 Clark, supra note 9, at 56. 
12 F.D.I.C. v. Wheat, 970 F.2d 124, 130 (5th Cir. 1992).   
13 Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 54 A.D.2d 654 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1976), aff’g 338 N.Y.S.2d 807 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976).  The fact that 
corporate speech furthers a director’s political views or goals 
would not typically give rise to a “conflict of interest” for corpo-
rate law purposes.  Heightened judicial scrutiny generally re-
quires a showing of financial “self-dealing” where a fiduciary 
“stands on both sides” of a transfer of assets to or from the cor-
poration.  Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 21-23 (Del. Ch. 2002) 
(“in the absence of self-dealing, it is not enough to establish the 
interest of a director by alleging that he received any benefit not 
equally shared by the stockholders”); Sullivan v. Hammer, 1990 
WL 114223, *5-*6 (Del. Ch. Aug. 7, 1990), aff’d 594 A.2d 48 (Del. 
1991) (corporate “gifts” merely required to be “within the range 
of reasonableness,” and board decision can be overturned on self-
dealing grounds “only if a plaintiff can show that a majority of 
the directors expected to derive personal financial benefit from 
the transaction”); see also Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 
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Expenditures by corporations on politics do not 
typically generate heightened scrutiny, and share-
holders cannot use derivative lawsuits to override de-
cisions about such expenditures by boards.14  These 
facts about corporate law hold true even if (in an un-
realistic hypothetical) shareholders were uniform in 
their political views, and uniformly opposed an ex-
penditure approved by the corporate board.  These 
facts are unquestionably true in a more typical situa-
tion where shareholders disagree among themselves 
about politics.  Nor do shareholders have indirect 
                                            
257 A.2d 398, 405 (Del. Ch. 1969); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 
280 A.2d 717, 721-22 (Del. 1971); Case v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 204 
N.E.2d 643, 646-47 (N.Y. 1965); Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 
776, 779 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968). 
14 Victor Brudney, Business Corporations and Stockholders’ 
Rights Under the First Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235, 257-58 
(1981).  The application of the deferential business judgment 
rule to political expenditures is so clear that few cases have even 
been pursued to a reported decision.  A rare example, in which 
the court held the business judgment rule was a valid defense to 
an attack on a corporate contribution to a political action com-
mittee, is Finley v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 128 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2000).  An exception that proves the rule is when political 
activity violates a statute, such as the statutory ban on corporate 
donations to a political party.  A legal violation removes judicial 
deference under the business judgment rule.  Miller v. Am. Tel. 
& Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759, 762 (3d Cir. 1974); cf. Barnes v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 87, 92-93 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1993) (claim by policyholder of mutual insurance company 
seeking to stop insurer from engaging in political activities dis-
missed because decision was protected by business judgment 
rule and policyholder had no constitutional right to prevent in-
surer’s use of premium revenues to support activities with which 
premium holder disagreed, nor to compel dividend to policyhold-
ers). 
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means to accomplish this goal—such as selling shares 
or using votes—as explained next. 
II. Most Individual Shareholders Cannot In-
directly Influence the Use of Their In-
vested Capital for Political Expression. 
The basic corporate law set out in Part I is some-
times viewed as incomplete because, it is asserted, 
shareholders have indirect methods of achieving what 
corporate law bars them from achieving through di-
rect control.  Shareholders, it is asserted or assumed, 
can “opt out” by withdrawing their funds if they do 
not approve of how directors are using their invested 
capital.15  Alternatively, they can use their power to 
vote to elect directors who will act as shareholders 
want.16   
These assumptions are wrong for most sharehold-
ers.  Controlling shareholders17 may be able to control 
directors, but most shareholders beneficially own 
stock as minority investors in corporations with dis-
persed ownership.  Most investors have little influ-
ence, direct or indirect, on a typical corporate board.  
As stated by the Chief Justice of the Delaware Su-
preme Court, “the practical realities of stock market 
ownership have changed in ways that deprive most 
                                            
15 E.g., Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 794 n.34 (a “shareholder invests 
in a corporation of his own volition and is free to withdraw his 
investment at any time and for any reason.”). 
16 E.g., id. at 794-95 (emphasizing shareholders’ “power to 
elect the board of directors” as a way “to protect their own inter-
ests.”). 
17 “Controlling shareholder” means a shareholder with suffi-
cient shares to determine the outcome of director elections.   
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stockholders of both their right to voice and their right 
of exit.”18  Both the right to sell and the right to vote 
are typically useless for shareholders as a means of 
controlling or influencing specific corporate actions, 
including the use of corporate funds for political pur-
poses. 
A. Shareholders do not typically have 
the right to compel a corporation 
to repurchase or find a buyer for 
their shares. 
Shareholders may not withdraw any of the funds 
they have invested in a corporation except insofar as 
a majority of the board approves a dividend or stock 
repurchase.19  Shareholders who wish to sell shares 
can only do so by finding third party buyers on their 
own.  But finding a buyer is typically difficult if not 
impossible at the majority of corporations, as dis-
cussed next.   
B. Shares of most corporations are 
not traded on public markets, and 
finding buyers for such shares is 
difficult or impossible. 
More than six million corporations file U.S. income 
                                            
18 Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Conservative Colli-
sion Course?: The Tension Between Conservative Corporate Law 
Theory and Citizens United, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 335, 370 
(2015). 
19 See Del. Code Ann. Title 8, § 151(b) (West 2017) (every Del-
aware corporation must have at least one class of non-redeema-
ble common stock); Blaustein v. Lord Baltmore Capital Corp., 84 
A.3d 954, 958-59 (Del. 2014); Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 
1379-80 (Del. 1993). 
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tax returns. 20   Only about 4,000 corporations are 
listed on a U.S. stock exchange—less than 0.1% of cor-
porations that filed tax returns.21  Of the rest, some 
are owned by a single shareholder, but many are ben-
eficially owned by dispersed minority owners.  Most 
publicly traded companies are bigger, on average, 
than companies that lack active public markets for 
their shares.  But many companies without public 
markets are still large and have substantial numbers 
of shareholders.  Examples include Cargill, with rev-
enues exceeding $130 billion and over 200 sharehold-
ers, and Mars, with revenues exceeding $33 billion 
and over 45 shareholders.22  Large non-listed compa-
nies also include those controlled by private equity 
                                            
20 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 2016 STATISTICS OF INCOME, 
2016 TAX STATISTICS 2 (2016), available at https://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-soi/16taxstatscard.pdf (including S corporations). 
21 Listed Domestic Companies, Total, THE WORLD BANK, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LDOM.NO (last 
visited Dec. 1, 2017).  More corporations are registered with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), OFFICE OF ECO-
NOMIC ANALYSIS, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
STUDY OF SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 SECTION 404 INTERNAL 
CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 21 (Sept. 
2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2009/sox-
404_study.pdf, but many do so because they have publicly traded 
bonds and few shareholders, or lack significant amounts of trad-
ing volume.  John C. Coates IV, The Powerful and Pervasive Ef-
fects of Ownership on M&A (June 2010), at 5, available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1884157 (Table 1). 
22  Andrea Murphy, America’s Largest Private Companies 
2014, FORBES (Nov. 5, 2014), available at http://www.forbes.com/
sites/andreamurphy/2014/11/05/americas-largest-private-com-
panies-2014/; see also Petro Lisowsky & Michael Minnis, Ac-
counting Choices and Capital Allocation: Evidence from Large 
Private U.S. Firms (Dec. 2016 working paper), at 16-18 & Table 
 
  
14 
funds, which represent dispersed investors through a 
variety of intermediaries.23  In total, the value of un-
listed corporations represents one-third to one-half of 
the value of all U.S. corporations.24   
Listed shares trade in significant volume—thou-
sands of shares per day.  By contrast, shares of the 
vast majority of corporations do not trade in public 
markets at all.  When they do trade, they do so only 
erratically.25  Finding a buyer for shares that are not 
                                            
3, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2373498 (analyzing data 
on number of private firms and the ownership of those private 
firms); Christian Leuz et al., Why Do Firms Go Dark? Causes 
and Economic Consequences of Voluntary SEC Deregistrations, 
45 J. ACCOUNT. ECON. 181, 181 (2008) (hundreds of corporations 
are no longer registered with the SEC but continue to have nu-
merous shareholders). 
23 Private equity funds invested $644 billion in U.S.-based 
companies in 2016.  Private Equity: Top States & Districts, 
AMERICAN INVESTMENT COUNCIL, http://www.investmentcoun-
cil.org/private-equity-at-work/education/private-equity-top-
states-districts/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2017).   
24 John C. Coates IV, Thirty Years of Evolution in the Roles 
of Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER 79, 89 (Jennifer G. Hill & 
Randall S. Thomas eds., Edward Elgar 2015) (Table 4.1).  SEC 
rules require registration by companies with more than 500 un-
accredited record shareholders (or more than 2000 accredited in-
vestors) and $10 million or more in assets.  15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78l, 
78m, 78o(d) (West 2017).  Public company shareholders are also 
unable to use sales or votes to influence political spending, for 
reasons discussed below. 
25 Leuz et al., supra note 22, at 184, 204-05 (reporting on pri-
vate companies with stocks that are traded but only at low lev-
els, with trading not occurring on many days).  Private equity 
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traded on public markets is difficult, and sometimes 
impossible, at least at any reasonable price.   
Shares of unlisted corporations trade at heavily 
discounted prices relative to their intrinsic value be-
cause of their lack of liquidity.26  One study found 
that, controlling for observable differences unrelated 
to liquidity, stocks increased in price by 25% when 
first listed on the New York Stock Exchange.27  Simi-
larly, a study showed that prices for companies with-
out publicly traded stock can be 30% lower than for 
comparable publicly held companies.28  A minority eq-
uity position does not have ability to control the deci-
sions of the company, resulting in a further decrease 
in value known as a “minority discount.”29  Even if 
shareholders are willing to accept such discounts, 
                                            
funds do not trade stocks, except as part of a sale of an entire 
corporation, as chosen by fund advisors, not fund investors. 
26 Reasons for this include:  Few buyers have information 
about such companies or sellers.  Few sellers have information 
about potential buyers, or even who they may be.  Few dealers 
hold such shares in inventory, and few brokers are available to 
look for buyers.  Few if any research analysts cover such compa-
nies.  Transaction costs will be significant relative to the sale.  
Such shares are held longer, tax bases are lower, and sales trig-
ger higher taxes.  Fraud risk is higher, as such companies are 
not subject to disclosure laws or SEC enforcement. 
27  Gary C. Sanger & John J. McConnell, Stock Exchange 
Listings, Firm Value, and Security Market Efficiency: The Im-
pact of NASDAQ, 21 J. FIN. QUANT. ANAL. 1, 14, 16 (1986). 
28 John Koeplin et al., The Private Company Discount, 12 J. 
APPL. CORP. FIN. 94, 95 (2000). 
29 John C. Coates IV, “Fair Value” as an Avoidable Rule of 
Corporate Law: Minority Discounts in Conflict Transactions, 147 
U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1262-63 (1999).  
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sales of stock of private companies take significant 
time and trigger taxes, reducing the attractiveness of 
“exit” in response to corporate actions the shareholder 
disfavors.  
In sum, the majority of individual owners of shares 
of the majority of corporations would incur significant 
economic costs to sell their shares.   
C. Stock sales cannot generally be 
used to prevent, deter, or influence 
the political activities of publicly 
traded companies. 
Even for shareholders of publicly listed companies, 
the ability to sell is generally not an effective remedy 
for undesirable corporate political expenditures.  Dis-
closure laws are currently such that shareholders do 
not receive information that would enable sales in ad-
vance of, or even in response to, political expendi-
tures.  From the perspective of the shareholder, a sale 
in response to an unwanted political expenditure 
would come too late, would be at a price where the 
expenditure was already “priced in,” and would entail 
relatively large costs (including taxes).  As such, indi-
vidual share sales would at best be the equivalent of 
closing the barn door after a horse has been stolen, 
the stock being sold at a price that already reflects the 
conduct to which the shareholder objected.  
Federal law does not require corporations to pro-
vide shareholders with advance notice of political ex-
penditures.30  In fact, most public companies do not 
disclose anything about political expenditures, even 
                                            
30 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Po-
litical Speech: Who Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83, 89 (2010). 
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after the fact, except for contributions to connected 
political action committees that are required to be dis-
closed under lobbying disclosure laws.  Efforts to pe-
tition the SEC to adopt disclosure requirements for 
public companies31 have to date been unavailing, and 
lobbying regulations are underenforced and far from 
comprehensive.32  While an increasing number of the 
very largest companies have voluntarily adopted dis-
closure policies, few make comprehensive disclo-
sures—they do not, for example, report their contri-
butions to trade groups that lobby on their behalf.33  
Almost none makes these disclosures in advance.34 
A prominent set of undisclosed corporate expendi-
tures are dues and other contributions to trade groups 
or organizations organized under Internal Revenue 
                                            
31 See COMMITTEE ON DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE POLITICAL 
SPENDING, PETITION FOR RULEMAKING (Aug. 3, 2011), available 
at http://sec.gov/rules/petitions/2011/petn4-637.pdf.   
32 Charles Fried et al., Lobbying Law in the Spotlight: Chal-
lenges and Proposed Improvements, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 419, 434-
36, 462-63 (2011).  
33 See ZICKLIN CENTER FOR BUSINESS ETHICS RESEARCH AT 
THE WHARTON SCHOOL OF THE UNIV. OF PENNSYLVANIA, THE 
2015 CPA-ZICKLIN INDEX OF CORPORATE POLITICAL DISCLOSURE 
AND ACCOUNTABILITY 14-15 (Center for Political Accountability 
2015), available at http://tinyurl.com/out9bfj.  Shareholders can 
seek information about political spending based on their rights 
to inspect corporate “books and records,” e.g., Del. Code Ann. Ti-
tle 8, § 220, but to be effective such requests typically require 
threatened or actual litigation and resources beyond those avail-
able to most shareholders. 
34 ZICKLIN, supra note 33, at 14-15.   
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Code subsections 501(c)(4) and 501(c)(6).35  Those or-
ganizations can spend up to half of their revenues on 
politics without being treated as “political” by the In-
ternal Revenue Service and without disclosing spe-
cific donors, and they may be able to spend more, to 
the extent tax law is underenforced.  Occasional leaks 
or accidental disclosures reveal that many public cor-
porations give substantial sums to these organiza-
tions.36  Outside such accidental disclosures, share-
holders ordinarily never learn about these expendi-
tures even after the fact, much less in advance.   
Shareholders thus have no means to respond to 
corporate political spending to which they object.  
Shareholders often never find out their money is be-
ing used to fund political expression or activity to 
which they would object, and even when they do find 
out, any sale of shares will be too late to allow them 
to “opt out” of that spending.  By the time the sale 
occurs, the political speech has already been made in 
the name of the corporation with the shareholders’ 
money.  Without comprehensive disclosure, even the 
deterrent effect of after-the-fact sales has little force.  
In addition, given that “market professionals gen-
erally consider most publicly announced material 
                                            
35 For data on spending by such organizations, see Bebchuk 
& Jackson, supra note 30, at 94. 
36 E.g., Jonathan Weisman, G.O.P. Error Reveals Donors and 
the Price of Access, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2014, at A15, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/25/us/republicans-corpo-
rate-donors-governors.html?_r=0 (article detailing inadvertent 
disclosures of members of 501(c)(4), including Coca-Cola, Exxon 
Mobil, Pfizer, and Walmart, each of which contributed at least 
$250,000). 
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statements about companies, thereby affecting stock 
market prices,”37 any expenditure will have already 
had whatever effect on share value it is likely to have 
by the time a shareholder learns about it, and any 
sale by the shareholder will be at a price reflecting 
that effect.  Sales of shares would also generate trans-
action costs and trigger taxes.  As a result, they would 
only occur if a shareholder were willing to incur ma-
terial economic losses to protest the use of the share-
holder’s invested capital. 
From the perspective of a corporate board, if 
shareholders sold shares en masse to protest the same 
political expenditure, and buyers of the stock shared 
the same negative view of the expenditure, the com-
pany’s stock price could fall, increasing its cost of cap-
ital.  However, shareholders have no way to coordi-
nate among themselves in choosing whether or when 
to sell.  They are also unlikely to respond uniformly 
or rapidly to the limited information available about 
political expenditures, in part because they (and po-
tential buyers of the stock) disagree about politics and 
the importance of any given expenditure. 
Even if shareholders could overcome their collec-
tive action problem, even if they had uniform views 
about politics, and even if potential buyers of their 
stock shared their views, companies raise relatively 
little capital from equity investors after their initial 
                                            
37 Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 
2398, 2403 (2014) (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 
248, n.28 (1988)). 
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public offerings.38  They instead rely on earnings and 
external debt to fund growth. 39   The prospect of 
slightly higher equity capital costs due to sales by 
shareholders would not deter most corporations from 
political activity. 
In sum, shareholders cannot control or deter polit-
ical expenditures by selling their stock, or threatening 
to do so, even at public companies.  This is true even 
though many individual shareholders may in fact dis-
approve of corporate political speech.  The majority of 
the beneficial owners of public companies have no 
practical way to withdraw their capital to prevent or 
control corporate political expenditures.  
D. Shareholder voting rights are not 
generally useful for directing or 
influencing specific corporate 
actions. 
The right to vote is no more useful than the right 
to sell for shareholders who wish to control corporate 
political expenditures.  The reason is simple:  Most 
shareholders—and the majority of individual share-
holders in public corporations—are not controlling 
shareholders.40  That is, they do not have sufficient 
                                            
38 JONATHAN BERK & PETER DEMARZO, CORPORATE FINANCE 
524-25 (Pearson, 3d ed. 2014). 
39 Id. 
40 See note 15 above.  A listed company will have in excess of 
500 shareholders on the company’s stock ledger (“record” share-
holders), and in fact public companies have on average more 
than 12,000 record shareholders.  Coates, supra note 21, at 5 
(Table 1).  Some companies, such as Procter & Gamble, have 
more than 2,000,000 shareholders.  Id. at 5.  By definition, only 
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voting rights to control their companies, nor do they 
have the capacity to acquire control of the companies 
in which they invest.  Their voting rights give them 
no practical ability to influence management gener-
ally, much less to control or opt out of specific political 
expenditures.   
The majority of corporations with dispersed own-
ership have one of two types of ownership structures, 
neither of which creates practical opportunities for 
voting rights to influence board decisions.  At many 
corporations, one person or small group has a control 
“block” with effective ability to control the election of 
                                            
one shareholder can be a “majority shareholder” for any com-
pany.  Even if several shareholders together control the com-
pany, the number of shareholders in the control group will usu-
ally be no more than a few.   
An average public company thus has 12,000 minority share-
holders and only one majority shareholder or a few control share-
holders.  Even this understates the ratio of minority to control 
shareholders, because (as discussed in Part III) two-thirds of rec-
ord shareholders are institutions, which invest on behalf of thou-
sands (or in aggregate, millions) of others.  Marshall E. Blume & 
Donald B. Keim, The Changing Nature of Institutional Stock In-
vesting (Nov. 12, 2014 working paper), at 2-3, available at http://
tinyurl.com/qhqskrp; Coates, supra note 24, at 81.  More than 95 
million individuals own shares through 3,200 U.S. domestic eq-
uity mutual funds, for example.  Kimberly Burham et al., Own-
ership of Mutual Funds, Shareholder Sentiment, and Use of the 
Internet, 2013, ICI RES. PERSP., Oct. 2013, at 1, available at 
https://www.ici.org/pdf/per19-09.pdf; BRIAN REID ET AL., 2015 IN-
VESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 177 (Investment Company In-
stitute, 5th ed. 2015) available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/
2015_factbook.pdf (Table 5).  Thus, the true ratio of minority to 
control shareholders is vastly higher than 12,000 to 2 or 3 that 
the record shareholder data suggest.   
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directors, which renders the nominal voting rights of 
minority investors incapable of changing the compo-
sition of the board. 41   Examples include Walmart, 
Ford, Google, and Facebook.  A recent study found 
that 96% of a representative sample of U.S. compa-
nies listed on a stock exchange have a voting block 
with 40% of the stock on average, and in many the 
block controls a majority of shares.42  Since directors 
are elected based on a plurality or majority of shares 
voted, an effort by a minority shareholder seeking to 
displace a director at these companies is either wholly 
futile (where a majority block will determine the out-
come), or would require convincing more than 95% of 
non-affiliated shareholders, a burden that is insur-
mountable in practice.   
In the second category, most public companies 
that lack majority or near-majority blockholders are 
large and have such dispersed ownership that few if 
any shareholders are capable of overcoming the costs 
of coordinating other shareholders to mount an effec-
tive election contest.43  To elect directors at public 
companies, shareholders must solicit “proxies,” which 
requires significant legal and communication costs.  
Incumbent directors, by contrast, can rely on corpo-
rate funds to pay their costs of fighting the contest.  A 
                                            
41 Clifford G. Holderness, The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in 
the United States, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 1377, 1378-80 (2009). 
42 Id. at 1382. 
43 KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 29, 62. 
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proxy contest typically lasts months44 and is “extraor-
dinarily expensive” for shareholders,45 who commonly 
incur more than ten million dollars in expenses46 and 
are still outspent by incumbents.47  Even when pur-
sued by well-resourced activist hedge funds, proxy 
contests are often unsuccessful.48  To give their proxy 
fights a boost, hedge funds build blocks of stock that 
are substantially larger than most individuals own or 
could afford—yet even hedge funds generally avoid 
full-blown proxy contests. 49   While activist hedge 
funds have been increasing in influence and activity 
levels over time, their resources well exceed those of 
most individuals.  Institutions that invest on behalf of 
                                            
44 Nickolay Gantchev, The Costs of Shareholder Activism: 
Evidence from a Sequential Decision Model, 107 J. FIN. ECON. 
610, 621 (2013) (Table 4). 
45 Jana Master Fund, Ltd. v. CNET Networks, Inc., 954 A.2d 
335, 341 (Del. Ch. 2008) (citing RANDALL S. THOMAS & CATHE-
RINE T. DIXON, ARANOW & EISHORN ON PROXY CONTESTS FOR 
CORPORATE CONTROL § 21.01 (3d ed. 2001 supp.)). 
46 Gantchev, supra note 44, at 610. 
47 Mark A. Stach, An Overview of Legal and Tactical Consid-
erations in Proxy Contests: The Primary Means of Effecting Fun-
damental Corporate Change in the 1990s, 13 Geo. Mason U. L. 
Rev. 745, 776 (1991).   
48 Gantchev, supra note 44, at 620. 
49 Id. at 618 (Gantchev assembles a comprehensive data set 
of proxy contests between 2000 and 2007 and identifies only 74 
that qualify—less than 0.1% of all elections of corporate directors 
over that period).  A more recent study finds a modest increase 
in 2008 and 2009, but then a fall-off in 2010, and in all years 
proxy contests occur in only a tiny fraction of board elections.  
Vyacheslav Fos & Margarita Tsoutsoura, Shareholder Democ-
racy in Play: Career Consequences of Proxy Contests, 114 J. FIN. 
ECON. 316, 339 (2014) (Fig A1). 
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most individuals—such as mutual funds and pension 
funds—rarely wage proxy contests.   
In sum, whether because of insider blocks, or be-
cause of the collective action costs of proxy contests, 
most shareholders of U.S. public companies do not 
have meaningful ability to use their votes to influence 
boards of directors about anything, much less specific 
political expenditures.  
III. Many Individuals Are Effectively 
Compelled to Maintain Investments in 
Companies Whose Political Expenditures 
They Do Not Know and Cannot Control. 
The bottom line of Part II is that the majority of 
individual shareholders cannot use their rights to sell 
or vote to avoid subsidizing corporate political speech 
or activity with which they disagree.  Reinforcing 
these limits are three trends in the ownership of U.S. 
corporations over the last thirty years.  These trends 
are towards (1) more institutional ownership, 
(2) more “layers” of institutions between individual 
owners and corporations, and (3) a general weakening 
of the ability of individuals to take action—whether 
through sales, votes, lawsuits, or otherwise—to re-
spond to corporate activities.   
A partial cause of these trends is the now-standard 
financial advice for individuals to invest in diversi-
fied, low-cost, broad-based baskets of stocks and to 
“buy and hold” for the long term.  Standard employer-
sponsored retirement savings plans—a channel 
through which an increasing share of investment 
flows—make it difficult or impossible for individuals 
to do otherwise.  Institutional intermediaries are not 
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generally required to pass along to individual inves-
tors information they may receive as record (i.e., for-
mal) shareholders about specific decisions by corpora-
tions they own.  Together, these forces effectively 
cause an increasing number of individuals to main-
tain investments in corporations, even if the individ-
uals disagree with political speech by corporations us-
ing their investment capital.   
A. Most beneficial owners of public 
corporations are individuals who 
own through institutions such as 
mutual funds and pension funds. 
Since the mid-20th century, institutions—pension 
funds, insurance companies, bank trusts, mutual 
funds, and other intermediaries—have held increas-
ing amounts of stock issued by American corpora-
tions.  Figure 1 reflects the Federal Reserve’s “Flow of 
Funds” data, a standard source of information about 
this trend.50  The Fed’s data make clear the general 
magnitude and persistence of the trend toward insti-
tutional ownership. 
                                            
50 BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, 
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES: FLOW OF FUNDS, 
BALANCE SHEETS, AND INTEGRATED MACROECONOMIC ACCOUNTS 
118 (2017), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/
z1/current/z1.pdf (Table L.223).  These data are not comprehen-
sive, and understate institutional ownership because they count 
private equity funds, non-profits, and hedge funds in the “house-
hold” sector.  Coates, supra note 24, at 89. 
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Figure 1:  Institutional Ownership  
of U.S. Corporate Equity   
 
Households  Institutions  Rest of World 
The increase in institutional ownership began as 
early as the 1950s, and has continued steadily ever 
since.  While ownership by the types of “institutions” 
the Fed tracks leveled off after 2000, other institu-
tions, such as hedge funds and private equity funds, 
have continued to increase their ownership.  The re-
sult is that less than one-third of total equity in U.S. 
companies is now held directly by individuals.  
The number of institutional layers between any 
given corporation and the individuals who indirectly 
own its stock (the “beneficial owners”) has also grown.  
Institutions own about 10% of stock held by equity 
mutual funds, and a larger share of other mutual 
funds—an increasing trend of individuals owning 
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shares of institutions, which in turn invest in other 
institutions, which in turn own corporate stock.51   
Mutual funds are a good example.  Corporate law 
only allows formal “record” owners that have held 
shares continuously or on a certain date to exercise 
shareholder rights.52  Mutual fund shares are com-
monly owned in “omnibus accounts” in which a broker 
pools shares on behalf of multiple clients in “sub-ac-
counts,” commonly including pension funds or insur-
ers, some of which invest on behalf of multiple benefi-
ciaries.53  This pooling and commingling means that 
individuals who invest their savings in mutual 
funds—or who were forced to put their workplace re-
tirement savings into mutual funds—are not the for-
mal owners of “record” of any of the companies their 
savings are supporting.  
                                            
51 REID ET AL., supra note 40, at 217 (funds of funds), 234 (in-
stitutional investors other than funds of funds) (Tables 45, 62). 
52 In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., 2015 WL 4313206, *3 (Del. Ch. 
July 13, 2015) (granting motion for summary judgment, holding 
institutional investors did not have appraisal rights because ad-
ministrative transfers among the layers of ownership violated 
what the court acknowledged was a technical and antiquated 
system focusing on continuous formal record ownership). 
53 OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS AND EXAMINATIONS, 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, NATIONAL EXAM RISK 
ALERT 1, 4 (Sept. 29, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/
about/offices/ocie/riskalert-mastersubaccounts.pdf. 
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B. Individuals who own stock through 
intermediaries do not have the 
right to direct the sale or votes of 
their shares. 
Most corporate stock held by institutions are held 
by separate legal entities, such as mutual funds, pen-
sion funds, insurance companies, hedge funds, and 
private equity funds.  Such entities do not pass 
through to their own beneficial owners either the 
rights to vote or sell the shares of the stock they pur-
chase.  Pension fund beneficiaries, for example, have 
no ability to influence the companies in which the 
funds are invested.54  Insureds have no ability to con-
trol how insurance companies invest the premiums 
they pay.  Investors in mutual funds or exchange-
traded funds do have the ability to select funds based 
on stated investment policies, just as annuitants gen-
erally have the ability to set basic investment param-
eters for how their funds are invested; once their 
funds are invested, however, the annuitants and fund 
investors have no ability to force the divestment of a 
particular corporate stock, and may only divest from 
the fund as a whole.  Even the professional managers 
of the increasingly important category of index funds 
cannot sell a given company’s stock, because they 
have precommitted to hold an entire index. 
Individuals who own any of these types of institu-
tional investments cannot exercise voting rights asso-
ciated with the shares.  Instead, those rights are ex-
ercised by the management of the institutions.  Indi-
viduals that invest through institutions face collective 
                                            
54 Adam Winkler, Beyond Bellotti, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 133, 
167 (1998). 
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action problems that are just as large as (if not larger 
than) those facing individuals who directly invest in 
corporations.  The result is that most individuals, who 
now primarily invest through separate entity inter-
mediaries, cannot even exercise the limited powers 
analyzed in Part II.   
To make these points concrete, consider an indi-
vidual who buys the stock of a large broad-based stock 
fund, such as Vanguard’s S&P 500 index fund.  That 
individual’s savings are invested in the stocks of com-
panies listed on the S&P index.  Currently, that fund 
owns shares of Apple, Inc.  If, hypothetically, Apple’s 
board or its government affairs officer were to spend 
money on political speech disfavored by the individ-
ual, the individual has no power to compel Vanguard 
to sell Apple stock in response.  Nor can the individual 
compel Vanguard to vote against Apple’s current di-
rectors.  All the individual can do is to sell the Van-
guard fund shares.  But if the individual wants to in-
vest in a broad-based large-cap fund of any kind, 
which would be advisable for reasons discussed next, 
that individual would only be selling Vanguard 
shares to buy another fund’s shares, which in turn 
would be likely to own Apple stock.  In short, unless 
an individual decides to ignore standard financial ad-
vice about how to invest, there is no way to avoid an 
investment in Apple, however disagreeable its politi-
cal activities may be.  
C. Individual investors have little 
prudent choice other than 
investing through institutions to 
achieve diversification. 
Part of the reason for the growth in institutional 
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investors is that finance theory and conventional fi-
nancial advice long ago identified the fact that most 
individuals are not well situated to select specific 
stocks from thousands of equity investments. 55  
Standard financial theory also has long identified di-
versification as an important tool for investors to 
achieve the best risk-adjusted returns.56   
Diversification entails identifying and maintain-
ing a substantial number of investments, not just one 
or a few, and monitoring the companies selected over 
time.  For example, when two companies merge, when 
one company goes bankrupt, or when a company di-
vests a major business, investors must “rebalance” 
their portfolios to maintain a desired degree of diver-
sification and risk.  Dividends must be reinvested, 
brokers retained, tax records kept, and filings made.  
Maintaining a diversified portfolio requires effort, ex-
pertise, and time. 
Professional asset management has also increas-
ingly been most cost-effective for individual investors 
through passive, indexed investment strategies. 57  
                                            
55 For an empirical study documenting the disadvantages in-
dividual direct investors face, see Brad M. Barber & Terrance 
Odean, Trading Is Hazardous to Your Wealth: The Common 
Stock Investment Performance of Individual Investors, 55 J. FIN. 
773 (2000). 
56 Harry M. Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77, 79 
(1952). 
57 Burton G. Malkiel, Returns from Investing in Equity Mu-
tual Funds 1971 to 1991, 50 J. FIN. 549, 571 (1995); RICHARD A. 
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 596 (Aspen Publishers, 8th 
ed. 2011). 
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Such strategies involve buying and holding broad-
based index funds or financial products that mimic 
such funds, which can achieve hard-to-beat returns at 
low cost over sustained periods of time.  Most nomi-
nally “active” mutual funds rely to a large extent on 
passive investment in baskets of stock, and simply 
“overweight” or “underweight” portions of the rele-
vant market benchmark.58  Pension funds, too, out-
source portfolio management to advisers that invest 
in large numbers of public companies, rather than a 
select few.   
A further force leading individuals to invest 
through institutions is the growing use of defined con-
tribution (DC) retirement plans such as 401(k) and 
403(b) plans.59  As noted above, some states require 
public employees to invest in DC plans,60 and in the 
private sector those plans may be effectively com-
pelled as well.  Investment through DC plans enjoys 
strong tax benefits61—or, equivalently, investors pay 
                                            
58  K.J. Martijn Cremers & Antti Petajisto, How Active Is 
Your Fund Manager? A New Measure That Predicts Perfor-
mance, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 3329, 3330 (2009). 
59 “Defined contribution” plans do not promise specific bene-
fits, but instead allocate specific amounts as elected by an em-
ployee from their wages (sometimes matched by the employer) 
into an investment account to be held for the employee’s benefit, 
typically until retirement.  In contrast, more conventional pen-
sion plans are called “defined benefit” plans because they prom-
ise beneficiaries a specific set of benefits in retirement, and the 
risk of investment shortfalls is borne by the plan sponsor.   
60 See supra pp. 5-6 & nn. 4-5.   
61 Retirement Savings Contributions Credit (Saver’s Credit), 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, https://www.irs.gov/Retirement-
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economic penalties to invest outside a plan.  As a re-
sult, “[v]irtually all saving by the working-age popu-
lation currently takes place within employer-spon-
sored pension plans.” 62   An annual survey of em-
ployer-sponsored plans found that 78% of eligible em-
ployees participate, and fully diversified plan options 
are the default and most common investment choice.63  
Less than 10% of DC plans gave employees the option 
to directly manage their investments in individual 
stocks, and even those impose additional fees on in-
vestors.64   
While employees are given choices within DC 
plans, these plans are designed by employers with lit-
tle input from typical employees.  Most plans impose 
significant limits on the flexibility of employee-inves-
tors to choose from the universe of potential invest-
ments, and commonly direct investments into the 
kind of diversified index or other broad-based funds 
that standard finance theory and advice recommends 
                                            
Plans/Plan-Participant,-Employee/Retirement-Savings-Contri-
butions-Savers-Credit (last updated Oct. 26, 2017) (“The amount 
of the [tax] credit is 50%, 20% or 10% of your retirement plan or 
IRA contributions up to $2,000 ($4,000 if married filing jointly), 
depending on your adjusted gross income . . . .”). 
62  Alicia H. Munnell et al., What’s the Tax Advantage of 
401(k)s?, CENTER FOR RETIREMENT RESEARCH AT BOSTON COL-
LEGE, Feb. 2012, at 6, available at http://tinyurl.com/ndjkdwh.   
63 AON HEWITT, 2014 UNIVERSE BENCHMARKS HIGHLIGHTS 1, 
4 (2014), available at http://tinyurl.com/n964gmq. 
64 Ian Ayres & Quinn Curtis, Beyond Diversification, 124 
YALE L.J. 1476, 1485 & n.28, 1539 (2015).   
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for individuals.65  An individual might get to select be-
tween an international index fund and an S&P 500 
fund, but would rarely get to select between investing 
in Apple and Walmart.  
“The most common type of investment options in 
401(k) plans are mutual funds or similar investment 
vehicles that pool funds managed by a professional 
fund manager.”66  Early withdrawals from these ac-
counts are tax penalized67 and discouraged by plan 
design.68  Similar tax subsidies and restrictions apply 
to 529 plans, which have been increasingly used by 
                                            
65  Anne Tucker, Flawed Assumptions: A Corporate Law 
Analysis of Free Speech and Corporate Personhood in Citizens 
United, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 497, 539 (2010); see also Anne 
Tucker, Retirement Revolution: Unmitigated Risks in the De-
fined Contribution Society, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 153, 181-82 (2013); 
BRIGHTSCOPE & INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, THE 
BRIGHTSCOPE / ICI DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLAN PROFILE: A 
CLOSE LOOK AT 401(K) PLANS 7, 15-17, 25 (2014), available at 
http://www.ici.org/pdf/ppr_14_dcplan_profile_401k.pdf (docu-
menting number of investment options, portion in types of asset 
classes, growth in indexed equity funds within DC plans, and 
that about 80% of plan assets are invested in diversified institu-
tions). 
66  Ayres & Curtis, supra note 64, at 1485, citing Sarah 
Holden et al., 401(k) Plan Asset Allocation, Account Balances, 
and Loan Activity in 2012, 19 ICI RES. PERSP. Dec. 2013 at 1, 21.   
67 I.R.C. § 401(k) (West 2017). 
68 Phil Edwards et al., Defined Contribution Plan Success 
Factors, DCIIA, May 2015, at 4, available at https://tinyurl.com/
yd9vgfmt.   
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individuals to save for college education for their chil-
dren.69  To benefit from the tax subsidies fueling the 
growth in DC plans, individuals must give up the 
right to choose or influence the corporations in which 
they invest.   
As a result of these trends in financial manage-
ment, it is difficult for most individual investors to 
find any means of investing in corporate stock that 
does not rely on both institutional intermediaries and 
a broad-based, index or quasi-index strategy for in-
vesting.  The bottom line is that most individuals now 
invest in a large number of public companies, but do 
so indirectly, and generally cannot pick and choose 
stocks based on the recent or expected specific behav-
ior of corporate issuers.  This is true for public em-
ployees in many states, and private employees across 
the nation.  
D. Institutional intermediaries are 
not generally required to track or 
disclose to their beneficiaries the 
political activities of the companies 
in which they invest. 
Another effect of increased institutional owner-
ship of corporate stock, and of increased “layers” of in-
stitutions, is to decrease further the amount of infor-
mation that a typical individual shareholder can ob-
tain about the political activities of the companies in 
which the individual invests.  As discussed above, 
                                            
69  See An Introduction to 529 Plans, SECURITIES AND EX-
CHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/intro
529.htm (last modified Jan. 6, 2014) (“participants in college sav-
ings plans have limited investment options and are not permit-
ted to switch freely among available investment options.”). 
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most corporations do not provide detailed information 
about political expenditures.  What limited infor-
mation they do provide to shareholders is given to 
shareholders of record, which are increasingly insti-
tutional investors.   
Institutions, in turn, report the values of their in-
vestments, but they are not required to gather, ana-
lyze, and pass on information about the activities of 
the companies in their portfolio.  Institutions such as 
mutual funds do not typically report to their investors 
even basic financial information about companies in 
which they invest, such as earnings, much less opera-
tional information such as political expenditures.  Nor 
do institutions typically devote any effort to monitor 
political activities of the companies in which they in-
vest.  Thus, even if individuals wanted to pressure the 
companies they indirectly own to alter political ex-
penditures, they would lack even the most basic 
rights to obtain information to know where to focus 
their pressure.   
E. Most individual investors are in 
practice compelled to maintain 
investments in companies that can 
engage in political expenditures 
with which the investors disagree. 
Together, the forces described in this Part III ef-
fectively compel an increasing number of individuals 
to maintain investments in large numbers of corpora-
tions, even if the individuals disagree with political 
expressions or activities taken by those corporations.   
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Individuals of course can choose not to invest in 
stock at all, or choose not to invest in stock through 
retirement plans.  But avoiding all equity investment 
imposes a massive economic penalty over time.70  Us-
ing conventional figures for expected returns on diver-
sified equity investments and contrasting them with 
investments in Treasury bonds, Figure 2 depicts how 
large the economic penalty of staying out of stocks al-
together grows over the course of a typical investor’s 
life.71 
The results are dramatic.  An investor in stocks 
can expect to have more than eight times as much 
money after 35 years as an investor making the same 
investment in government bonds.  There simply is no 
economic “option” for ordinary individuals saving for 
retirement to choose to avoid stocks altogether.  
                                            
70  Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions, Corporations, and Political 
Opt-Out Rights After Citizens United, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 800, 
838-40 (2012). 
71 The figure uses data from Aswath Damodaran, Annual Re-
turns on Stock, T.Bonds and T.Bills: 1928-Current, http://
pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/
histretSP.html (last updated Jan. 5, 2017).  It assumes a fixed 
one-time investment of $1,000 by an investor at age 30, and com-
pounds returns annually on a diversified portfolio of equity in-
vestments using an expected rate of return composed of the 
Treasury bond rate of 2.22% and an implied equity risk premium 
of 6.28%, derived from trailing twelve-month cash yield on in-
vestments in the S&P 500.  It compares the return on that in-
vestment with the return on investment on Treasury bonds over 
the same period.   
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Figure 2:  The Cost of Opting Out of Stock  
 
The same general point applies to the decision to 
opt out of the tax advantages of broadly diversified 
DC plans.  Figure 3 depicts how large the economic 
penalty of electing to invest directly in stocks and not 
through tax-advantaged DC plans can be.72  While not 
as severe as the cost of avoiding equity altogether, the 
cost of trying to avoid the constraints of 401(k) plans 
                                            
72 This figure uses conventional figures for expected equity 
returns and averages after-tax returns for taxable and tax-de-
ferred accounts over the past twenty-five years, based on data 
and analysis from Munnell et al., supra note 62, at 5 (Table 4).  
It assumes a 6% expected pre-tax return, divided into 2% divi-
dends and 4% capital gains.   
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by investing directly in taxable accounts is still a dra-
conian penalty, roughly equal to a third of the ex-
pected return on a standard equity investment.  And 
this figure understates the penalty, because it ex-
cludes the “match” commonly given by employers for 
investments through DC plans, and only compares 
one investment at age 30, rather than a more realistic 
stream of investments over time. 
Figure 3:  The Cost of Opting Out of  
Tax-Advantaged 401(k) 
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CONCLUSION 
Amici urge careful consideration of the issues in 
this case for the reasons stated above. 
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